Reepicheep's Notes on Part I, Section III

Part I, Section III: Concerning the Meaning of the Terms—Necessity, Impossibility, Inability, and Contingence

In this section, Edwards again makes a distinction between words used in common speech (he uses the term ‘vulgar’ for these) and the same words used in philosophical debates about the Will (he cites ‘metaphysicians, divines, philosophers and theologians’). Instead of bemoaning scholarship, he directs his efforts here to make philosophical usages clear since his essay must address them.

I understand his use of “necessity” best when it is held up as an opposite to “impossible.” The word “impossible” implies an understanding of “possible.” In that sense, “possibility” is the referent for “impossibility.” But “necessity” is where something must occur—it is more than possible; it “must” exist or come to pass.

This is not how we use the word in ordinary conversation—as Edwards warns us. I might say, “It is necessary for you to walk through the bedroom in order to access the washroom in our apartment.” You might reply, “OK, unless I climbed through the washroom window instead.” The sense in which I had used “necessity” assumed polite behavior. This usage is an example of the word in ordinary, “vulgar” use.

“Philosophical Necessity,” on the other hand might sound like this: “Necessity demands that you first leave the living room in order to make an arrival in the washroom.” Or, “Given the state of nature, it is necessary to exist in only one room at a time.” There is a “must” between the subject and the condition of action. A quarrel with this sort of “Philosophical Necessity” would force an allowance of radically absurd “impossibilities” (e.g. it would have to be allowed that one can both be and not be the same thing, etc). The law of noncontradiction, basic to all western thought, undergirds this understanding of Philosophical Necessity.

If I have properly interpreted his meaning, the following quotations from this section unfold neatly:

“When the subject and predicate of the proposition, which affirms the existence of any thing, either substance, quality, act, or circumstance, have a full and certain connexion, then the existence or being of that thing is said to be necessary, in a metaphysical sense. And in this sense I use the word necessity in the following discourse, when I endeavour to prove that necessity is not inconsistent with liberty.” (p. 19, ¶3) For instance, if we consider the statement “God is holy,” it is first necessary in the philosophical sense which Edwards will use the word to agree that the understanding, “God exists” is the metaphysical basis for, “God is holy.” Being itself precedes a property of that being’s nature.

“. . . the only way that any thing that is to come to pass hereafter, is or can be necessary, is by a connexion with something that is necessary in its own nature, or with something that already is, or has been; so that the one being supposed, the other certainly follows. And this, also, is the only way that all things past, excepting those which were from eternity, could be necessary before they came to pass, or could come to pass necessarily; and therefore the only way in which any effect or event, or any thing whatsoever that ever has had or will have a beginning, has come into being necessarily, or will hereafter necessarily exist. And therefore this is the necessity which especially belongs to controversies about the acts of the will.” (p. 21, ¶2) A marriage vow promises faithfulness, “in sickness and in health,” but this promise of future faithfulness is predicated on the character of the person making the promise. The future fulfillment of that vow depends on (1) the fixed definition of faithfulness and (2) the quality of the person who has sworn their loyal love. In this sense we might say, “If you are faithful, you will keep your marriage vows.” Philosophical Necessity then hangs upon the nature of “faithfulness.” It is precisely because no man or woman is necessarily faithful by nature that wedding vows are made before God and fellow men. A husband and wife must seek God to teach them steadfast love—precisely because it is not found in human nature but in Him alone! Of God we can say, “He causes the rain to fall on the just and the unjust.” This is a pan-historical statement: it has been so from the beginning and it will be until the end. The statement necessarily depends on the nature of God Himself. Because God is all-aware and all-powerful in His nature (i.e. these qualities are what render Him to be “God” over and against a “god”), it necessarily follows that He, “causes the rain to fall on the just and the unjust.”

~Reepicheep~